A key motivation behind recent donor attention and financial resources devoted to developing countries is the presumed connection between weak and failing states, on the one hand, and a variety of transnational threats, on the other. Indeed, it has become conventional wisdom that poorly performing states generate multiple cross-border "spillovers," including terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, regional instability, global pandemics, and energy insecurity. What is striking is how little empirical evidence underpins such sweeping assertions. A closer look suggests that the connection between state weakness and global threats is less clear and more variable than typically assumed. Both the type and extent of "spillovers" depend in part on whether the weakness in question is a function of state capacity, will, or a combination of the two. Moreover, a preliminary review suggests that some trans-border threats are more likely to emerge not from the weakest states but from stronger states that possess narrower but critical gaps in capacity and will. Crafting an effective U.S. and international strategy towards weak states and the cross-border spillovers they sometimes generate will depend on a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms linking these two sets of phenomena. The challenge for analysts and policymakers will be to get greater clarity about which states are responsible for which threats and design development and other external interventions accordingly. This working paper represents an initial foray in this direction, suggesting avenues for future research and policy development.
Introduction
It has become commonplace to assert that the gravest dangers to U.S. and world security are no longer military threats from rival great powers but transnational threats emanating from the world's most poorly governed countries. "Since the end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for international order," writes Francis Fukuyama.
2 Official Washington agrees. Nations that are incapable of exercising "responsible sovereignty," says Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, have a "spillover effect" in the form of terrorism, weapons proliferation and other dangers. 3 This new focus on weak and failing states represents an important shift in U.S. threat perceptions. Before 9/11, U.S. policymakers viewed states with sovereignty deficits primarily through a humanitarian lens: they piqued our moral conscience but possessed little strategic significance. Al Qaeda's ability to act with impunity from Afghanistan changed this calculus, convincing the Bush Administration that "the United
States today is threatened less by conquering states than we are by weak and failing ones."
This new threat perception has quickly become conventional wisdom at home and abroad. Government officials, academics and the media have linked poorly performing developing countries to a vast array of threats to global security and well-being, from transnational terrorism to international crime, humanitarian catastrophes, regional instability, global pandemics, mass migration and environmental degradation.
5 Table 1 contains some representative claims. The attacks of September 11, 2001 reminded us that weak states can threaten our security as much as strong ones, by providing breeding grounds for extremism and havens for criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists. Such lawlessness abroad can bring devastation here at home.
--Richard Haass, State Department Director of Policy Planning (January 14, 2003)
When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap across the world. Terrorism, political violence, civil wars, organized crime, drug trafficking, infectious diseases, environmental crises, refugee flows and mass migration cascade across the borders of weak states more destructively than ever before.
--USAID, Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity (2003)
Failed and failing states and those emerging from conflict pose one of today's greatest security challenges. They are breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, and humanitarian catastrophes, and can destabilize an entire region.
--Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State (2005)
The idea that weak states can compromise security --most obviously by providing havens for terrorists but also by incubating organized crime, spurring waves of migrants, and undermining global efforts to control environmental threats and disease --is no longer much contested.
--Washington Post, June 9. 2004
Successful international actions to battle poverty, fight infectious disease, stop transnational crime, rebuild after civil war, reduce terrorism and halt the spread of dangerous materials all require capable, responsible States as partners.
--Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Our Secure World (2004)
If states are fragile, the peoples of the world will not enjoy the security, development, and justice that are their right. Therefore, one of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all states are strong enough to meet the many challenges that they face.
--Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (2005)
Failed or failing states are among the great challenges of our age…. They spread chaos to their neighbors and beyond. They are actual or potential sources of terrorism, organized crime, drugs, disease, and refugees…Something needs to be done. Yet nobody quite knows what.
--Mark Turner and Martin Wolf, "The Dilemma of Fragile States," Financial Times, February 18, 2005
This new strategic orientation has already begun to have policy and institutional consequences. At home, it has informed recent U.S. defense, intelligence, diplomatic, development and even trade initiatives. The latest National Defense Strategy departs from a traditional focus on interstate war by calling on the U.S. military to strengthen the sovereign capacities of weak states to control their territories and combat the internal threats of terrorism, insurgency and organized crime. 6 Beyond expanded training of foreign security forces, the Pentagon is seeking interagency buy-in for a comprehensive U.S. strategy to address the world's "ungoverned areas." 7 The Central Intelligence Agency --which has identified 50 such zones globally --is devoting new collection assets to long-neglected parts of the world. 8 The National
Intelligence Council is helping the State Department's new Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization identify states at risk of collapse, so that the office can launch conflict prevention and mitigation efforts. 9 Not to be outdone, the US Agency for International Development has formulated its own "Fragile States Strategy" to bolster countries that may otherwise breed terror, crime, instability and disease. 10 The Bush administration has even justified trade liberalization initiatives like the Central American Free Trade Area as a means to prevent state failure and its associated transnational threats.
11
This new preoccupation with weak states is not limited to the United States. In Great
Britain the Prime Minister's strategy unit has advocated a government-wide approach to stabilizing fragile countries that might otherwise generate global ills ranging from uncontrolled migration to organized crime. 12 Governments in Canada and Australia are following suit. The United Nations has been likewise engaged. The unifying theme of the past year's UN reform proposals was the need for effective sovereign states to deal with today's global security Clarifying the connection between these two sets of phenomena is critical not only to advancing collective security but also to promoting global development. It is the inhabitants of the developing world, above all, that that bear the main brunt of state weakness and its attendant spillovers. Many low-income countries simply do not possess the institutional capacity and/or will to deliver the basic political goods required to achieve sustainable development. Lacking even minimal levels of resilience, they are more vulnerable than rich nations to illicit networks of terrorists or criminals, cross-border conflict, and devastating pandemics. For the inhabitants of these countries, the route out of poverty must include the creation of states capable of performing basic functions, including arresting or transforming transnational forces.
This working paper seeks to initiate such a conversation. It concludes that weak states do often incubate and generate global threats, but that this correlation is far from universal. Crafting a more effective U.S. and international strategy towards state weakness in the developing world and the cross-border spillovers it sometimes generates will depend on a deeper understanding of the underlying mechanisms linking these two sets of phenomena.
Defining Weak and Failing States
The initial task is to identify the population of weak and failing states. State strength is a relative concept. It can be measured by the state's ability and willingness to provide fundamental political goods associated with statehood, notably: physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social welfare. Around the world many states have critical capacity gaps in one or more of these four areas of governance, broadly conceived. In effect, they possess legal but not empirical sovereignty. 25 In the security realm, they struggle to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, provide security from external and internal threats, control borders and territory, ensure public order and provide safety from crime. In the political realm, they lack legitimate governing institutions that provide checks on political power, protect basic rights and freedoms, hold leaders accountable, deliver impartial justice and efficient Compared to other developing countries, weak and failing states are more prone to suffer from low growth and are among the developing countries farthest from the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals. 29 That is, their inhabitants are more likely to be poor and malnourished, live with chronic illness and die young, lack access to education and basic health care, suffer gender discrimination, and lack access to modern technology. They are also disproportionately at risk of violence and humanitarian crises, both natural and man-made. 30 The
World Bank estimates that fragile states are fifteen times more prone to civil war than OECD countries, and such violence is both more extreme and longer lasting than conflict in other developing countries. 31 Such countries are the overwhelming source of the world's refugees and internally displaced peoples, and many are among the world's worst abusers of human rights.
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There is no consensus on the precise number of weak and failing states, because there is no consensus on how to define or measure state weakness. 33 The differences in the criteria used to define state capacity, the indicators used to gauge it, and the relative weighting of various aspects of governance.
37
The most comprehensive and well-respected system for evaluating state performance is the World Bank's "Governance Matters" data set, which ranks 209 countries and territories along six dimensions: voice and accountability; political instability and violence; government effectiveness; regulatory burden; rule of law; and control of corruption.
38 Table 3 lists the 44
countries that rest in the bottom quintile, ranked from weakest (Somalia) to strongest (Algeria). Second, the list of "weak and failing states" in Table 3 obviously captures a diverse collection of countries that pose an array of potential challenges to U.S. foreign and national security policy --as well as for U.S. development policy. Most of the countries with the weakest governance are either in conflict or recovering from it, have experienced recurrent bouts of political instability, and rank among the lowest in terms of the "human security" they provide to their inhabitants. 39 Several are "outposts of tyranny," in the Bush administration's parlance (e.g.,
North Korea, Belarus, Cuba, and Zimbabwe), authoritarian states which appear superficially strong but rest on a brittle foundation. Others are sites of ongoing U.S. combat and reconstruction efforts (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan); active or potential proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (e.g., North Korea, Iran and Pakistan); past or present safe havens for terrorism (e.g., Afghanistan, Yemen); anchors of regional stability or instability (e.g., Nigeria, Pakistan); bases for narcotics trafficking and organized crime (e.g., Burma); potential sources of uncontrolled migration (e.g., Haiti); critical energy suppliers (e.g., Venezuela, Nigeria); locations of epidemic disease (e.g., Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo), and settings for recent atrocities and humanitarian crises (e.g., Sudan, Liberia, Burundi, Sierra Leone). Needless to say, these categories of concern often overlap in particular states.
Third, as will become clear below, the relationship between state weakness and spillovers is not linear. It varies by threat. Some salient transnational dangers to U.S. security come not from states at the bottom quintile of the Governance Matters rankings, but from the next tier up --countries like Colombia, the world's leading producer of cocaine, or Saudi Arabia, home to a majority of the 9/11 hijackers. These states tend to be better run and more capable of delivering political goods: indeed, nearly half are eligible --or on the threshold of eligibility --for the MCA How do these sets of states correlate with significant transnational threats to the United States and the international community? The answer depends in part on how we define "security."
Transnational Threats and U.S. National Security
The growing concern with weak and failing states is premised on the belief that such states are 
Dens of Thieves?
Beyond posing terrorist or proliferation risks, weak, failing and post-conflict states are said to The relationship between transnational organized crime and weak states is parasitic. All things being equal, criminal networks are naturally drawn to environments where the rule of law is absent or imperfectly applied, law enforcement and border controls are lax, regulatory systems are weak, contracts go un-enforced, public services are unreliable, corruption is rife, and the state 65 If state weakness is often a necessary condition for the influx of organized crime, however, it is not a sufficient one. Even more than a low risk operating environment, criminals seek profits. In a global economy, realizing high profits depends on tapping into a worldwide market to sell and transship illicit commodities and the proceeds, which in turn depends on access to financial services and modern telecommunications and transportation infrastructure.
Such considerations help explain why South Africa and Nigeria have become magnets for transnational (and domestic) organized crime and why Togo has not. 71 Criminals will accept the higher risks of operating in states with greater capacity in return for greater rewards.
In addition, the link between global crime and state weakness varies by sector. Plague and Pestilence?
The rapid spread of avian influenza, which could conceivably kill tens of millions of people, has made infectious disease a first tier national security issue. There is growing concern within both the public health and foreign policy communities that weak and failing states may serve as important breeding grounds for new pandemics and --lacking adequate capacity to respond to them --endanger global health. Indonesia's struggle to deal simultaneously with bird flu and polio is a case in point. 80 As Clive Bell and Maureen Lewis write, "failed or faltering states cannot or will not perform basic public health functions,…placing the rest of the world at risk." 81 Since 1973 more than 30 previously unknown disease agents, including HIV/AIDS, Ebola, and West Nile virus have emerged, for which no cures are available. Most of these have emerged in developing countries. Over the same span, more than 20 well known pathogens, including TB, malaria and cholera, have reemerged or spread, often in more virulent and drugresistant forms. 82 In an age of mass travel and global commerce, in which more than 2 million people cross international borders a day and air freight exceeds 100 billion ton kilometers a year, inadequate capacity or insufficient will to respond with vigorous public health measures can quickly threaten lives across the globe. 83 National security and public health experts alike worry that weak and failed states --which invest little in epidemiological surveillance, health information and reporting systems, primary health care delivery, preventive measures, or response capacity --will lack the means to detect and contain outbreaks of deadly disease.
These worries are well-founded. Although there is little solid data on the link between state capacity and patterns of epidemics, we do know that the global infectious disease burden falls overwhelmingly (90%) on low and middle income countries that account for only eleven percent of global health spending. The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center has devised a typology of countries by health care status, ranking nations into five categories, on the basis of the resources and priority they devote to public health, the quality of the care they deliver, the access they provide to drugs, and their capacity for surveillance and response. The bottom two quintiles are the overwhelming source of the world's seven deadliest infectious diseases:
respiratory infections, HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases, TB, malaria, hepatitis B and measles. 84 Sub-Saharan Africa is most afflicted, containing only 10% of the world's population but 90% of its malaria and 75% of its HIV/AIDS cases. 85 The spread of infectious disease is being driven partly by breakdowns in public health care, especially during periods of political turmoil and war. Malaria is a case in point. One study has shown that for every 1,000 refugees that cross into an African country, the host state acquires 1,400 new malaria cases. 86 HIV/AIDS is another. Nearly all the cases of the disease in South and Southeast Asia can be traced to strains that evolved in northern Burma, an ungoverned warren of drug gangs, irregular militias and human traffickers. Similarly, the collapse of the Democratic Republic of the Congo transformed that country into a Petri dish for the evolution of numerous strains of the virus. Nor does peace always improve matters, at least initially: In Ethiopia and several other African countries, the rise in prevalence of HIV/AIDS parallels the return and demobilization of ex-combatants and their reintegration into society. 87 Beyond countries in conflict, many developing and transitional states possess decrepit and decaying public health systems that can easily be overwhelmed. Over the past decade and a half, the states of the former Soviet Union have all experienced spikes in the incidence of measles, TB, and HIV. 88 In spring 2005, weak health infrastructure in Angola amplified an outbreak of the hemorrhagic fever Marburg. 89 The same year, the government of Nigeria failed to enforce a national immunization program, allowing polio, a disease on the brink of eradication, to spread across a broad swath of Africa and beyond, to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia. 90 Diseases incubated in weak and failing states pose both direct and indirect threats to the United States. The direct threat is the prospect that significant numbers of Americans may become infected and die. The indirect threat is that such epidemics may impose high economic costs and undermine key countries or regions. The economic costs of disease are tangible: The
World Bank estimates that SARS cost the East Asian regional economy some $15-30 billion, despite killing only 912 people. 91 The political costs are more nuanced but no less real. As the African experience with HIV/AIDS testifies, pandemics not only exploit state weakness but also exacerbate it. In the most heavily affected African countries, HIV/AIDS has decimated human capital and fiscal systems, undermining the already limited capacity of states to deliver basic services, control territory, and manage the economy. It has strained health and education systems, weakened armies, eroded social cohesion, and undermined agriculture and prospects for growth. The pandemic is now spreading rapidly into Eurasia and could surge to 110 million cases by 2010, with dramatic increases in India, China, Russia and other countries of strategic significance. 92 It was such concerns that led the UN Security Council in January 2000 to declare the HIV/AIDS virus a threat to international "stability and security".
Energy Insecurity?
The doubling of world oil prices in 2005 exposed strains and volatility in the global energy market, at a time of surging global demand, intensifying competition over dwindling reserves and instability in key producer countries from Iraq to Nigeria to Venezuela. To some, these trends suggest that reliance on oil and gas from weak and failing states may endanger U.S. and global energy security by increasing the volatility, costs and risk of interruption of supplies.
Beyond requiring payment of a significant "insecurity premium," such dependence may complicate the pursuit of broader U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. faltering governance anywhere should be of concern, U.S. officials need to set priorities and make tough choices about where, when and how to engage. Academics and policymakers must try to identify which threats are most likely to arise from which countries, so that they can determine where U.S. involvement is particularly warranted and tailor state-building efforts in ways likely to mitigate the most salient dangers.
To aid this enterprise, I offer some tentative hypotheses to be investigated by further research. First of all, recall the distinction between state capacity and will as determinants of good governance and state functionality. One testable hypothesis is that a weak state's propensity to generate spillovers, as well as the nature of these threats, will vary according to whether that weakness is a function of capacity, will, or both. All things being equal, it is reasonable to predict that countries lacking both capacity and will for good governance should generate the most transnational threats. Accordingly, we should expect to find the six categories of spillovers clustering around such states. Another plausible hypothesis is that states that are irresponsible as well as (or instead of being) powerless should be more likely to generate transnational threats that are not merely malignant --such as epidemics --but also malevolent, such as terrorism and weapons proliferation.
A second hypothesis is that particular transnational threats --and the manifestations of those threats --are likely to correlate with specific shortcomings in state capacity. A third testable hypothesis would be that some threats are more closely correlated with the weakest quintile of states, whereas others are more associated with the next tier up. The concept of "spillover," after all, implies a transnational connection. In some cases, such as violent conflicts or epidemics, spillovers can travel fairly easily from the weakest states. In other cases, including WMD proliferation and some forms of crime, the transnational diffusion of threats is more likely to come from states that are superficially strong but possess critical "sovereignty holes," and which provide easy access to the transportation, communications and financial infrastructure of the global economy. If this hypothesis is borne out in empirical analysis, the implication is profound: a state need not possess capacity or commitment gaps across the board to pose a major risk of spillovers. A few critical gaps can make all the difference, and these should be targeted by external actors.
A fourth hypothesis, finally, would be that transnational forces exert a powerful reciprocal impact by weakening state capacities in the developing world. To date, the emphasis of policy research has been on the implications of poor governance in developing countries for the security of the developed world. Less extensive research has been conducted on the impact of malignant and malevolent cross-border forces, whether terrorism, crime or disease, on institutional strength in the developing world.
A Roadmap for U.S. Policy
While more research is clearly warranted, it is not too soon to offer some recommendations for a more effective U.S. strategy toward weak and failing states. Such a strategy would have at least three components lacking in current Bush administration policy:
• deeper intelligence collection and analysis on the links between state weakness and transnational threats;
• improved policy coherence to integrate all instruments of U.S. national influence in crisis countries; and
• more robust international engagement to leverage the efforts of partners and allies who share our interest in stemming the negative spillovers of state weakness in the developing world.
Since late 2004, the National Intelligence Council has prepared a semi-annual "Instability Watch List" that identifies countries a risk of state failure within the next two years. While this is a welcome development, busy policymakers find only marginal utility in periodic warning products that resemble little more than the US News and World Report "conventional wisdom watch" (with the requisite up and down arrows). To be useful, such a list should be also be accompanied by a consequences matrix that outlines not only the potential negative developments within each country but also the implications of such turmoil for transnational threats likely to affect U.S. security and broader national interests, such as disruption of oil supplies, regional instability, or WMD proliferation. Such a sophisticated early warning system could become an essential tool in helping policymakers determine where to devote the bulk of U.S. efforts and in building the political will necessary for effective preventive action. (At the same time, we must guard against ignoring entirely those countries where spillovers are less immediately apparent, bearing in mind that prediction is an inexact science).
Second, the U.S. government must replace its current fragmented approach to weak and failing states with a truly integrated strategy that allows all relevant tools of national power to be brought to bear in the service of coherent country plans. Over the past year and a half, the State Department and Pentagon have made modest progress in creating a standing interagency capacity for stabilizing and rebuilding war-torn societies. There has been no similar effort to define a unified interagency strategy to help prevent states from sliding into failure and violence in the first place. Too often, our nation's engagement with individual weak states is little more than a collection of independent, loosely coordinated bilateral diplomatic, military, aid, trade, and financial relationships, heavily influenced by the institutional mandates and bureaucratic hobbyhorses of respective agencies. This needs to end. What has been missing is a truly integrated approach that unites the "3D"s of U.S. foreign policy --defense, development, and diplomacy --as well as intelligence, finance, and trade policies, as is beginning to occur in some allied governments. This integration should occur not only in Washington but also at U.S.
embassies abroad, within "country teams" under the direction of the ambassador. The precise strategy for each country will vary according to the perceived root causes of weakness. Where it is primarily a question of capacity, the United States should help enable the state fill those gaps.
Where will is lacking, it should deploy incentives to persuade or compel a stronger commitment.
Where both are absent, the challenge will be to change the attitudes of the leadership while working with civil society to build relevant capacities and empower agents of reform. 
